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Abstract 
Aiming at the market distortions of non-eco products drives out eco-products and based on the related theory of 
economics, this paper probes the institutional sources of eco-economy problems, builds and analyzes the complete 
but imperfect information dynamic game model of bivalent eco-products transaction. In order to coordinate the vital 
interests between producers and consumers, we should establish effective eco-economy mechanism from the aspect 
of government, enterprise, and society. 
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1. Introduction 
The institutional sources of eco-economy problems are mainly embodied in three aspects: market 
failure, government failure and the lack of social system. Among them, the sources of market failure  in  
eco-economy problems refer to public goods, externalit ies and information asymmetries , etc. [1-2] 
Asymmetric information of eco-economy problems refers to two types: moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Just take the consumers buying eco-products for example, because the absence of the related 
system for the cert ification of eco-product mark, and based on the reason that the non-eco-products are 
relatively cheaper and difficu lt for consumers distinguish whether they are eco-friendly technology used, 
consumers often tend to buy the non-eco-products when confronted with the selection between diverse 
eco-products and non-eco-products, thus bringing the “bad money drives out the good money” 
phenomenon of “non-eco products expel eco-products” into being, and may eventually cause the 
abnormal operation and paralysis of entire eco-products market. [3-5] Based on the related theory of 
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economic game, this paper is designed to analyze the phenomenon of “non-eco products expel eco-
products”, provide countermeasures for the sound development of the market and useful references for the 
design of eco-economy system. 
2. Economic Game Analysis of Eco-products Transaction 
2.1 Dynamic Game Analysis of Complete Information in Bivalent Eco-products Transaction 
On the basis of the theory of utility and production in economics, the eco-products enterprises often 
adjust the price based on the product quality and the market supply. For the eco-products consumers, 
because they don’t understand the producers’ production decision in the first stage and often make 
decisions and determine whether to buy or not main ly based on their purchasing power or its opposite- 
commodity prices, and product quality, so the buyers are one game part in the imperfect information 
market. [6] Because the sellers (producers) and buyers (consumers) all have full acknowledge of each 
other’s ultimate benefit informat ion when under d ifferent strategies , the game model is incomplete 
informat ion game. Both the producers and consumers make decisions step by step and one after another, 
so the game model is a dynamic game. In summary, the game model o f b ivalent price eco-products 
transaction this paper has established and probed belongs to the dynamic game model of complete but 
imperfect information. 
Suppose in the first stage, producers could decide the item that whether to produce the eco-labeled 
products(eco-products, be called e) o r non-eco-products (be called  n); for consumers, the effectiveness of 
buying eco-products, that is the satisfaction degree is V, the effect iveness of buying non-eco-products is 
W, and obviously V>W. In the second stage, the sellers could decide the high price (assumed as Ph) or 
low price (assumed as Pl) not only on the production of eco-products, but also on the non-eco-products. 
When the consumers are about to buy the products, the producers often take various factors into 
consideration and decide whether to sell at high price(Ph) or low price(Pl), and clearly Ph>Pl. 
Assuming that producers  need to camouflage the products only when they produce the non-eco-
products and also want to sell at a high price, thus resulting in disguised expenses (assumed as C). 
Based on economic game theory and above assumptions, we could establish the following game tree: 

Fig.1. Model of entirely imperfect dynamic game of bivalent ecological productions transaction 
In the figure above, Y means consumers buying the eco-products or the non-eco-products, otherwise 
be called N. According to the analysis needed, we could make a further assumption that VPh>W
Pl>0>WPh. [7] This inequality means that it is more cost-effective to buy eco-products with high prices  
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than non-eco-products with low price (the satisfaction degree of eco-products with high price is h igher 
than the non-eco-products with low price), what’s more, the non-eco-products with low price is still not at 
a loss (the satisfaction degree of non-eco-products with low price  from the consumers is more than 0). 
However, they will suffer a lot when buying the non-eco-products with high prices (the satisfaction 
degree of non-eco-products with high price from the consumers is less than 0). This is usually a more 
realistic and practical assumption and rational economic-man assumption as well. Of course, for 
consumers, in  the complete but imperfect dynamic game model of eco-products market, there is a more 
desirable possibility that the effectiveness of buying eco-products with low prices is higher than eco-
products with high prices , that is, VPl>VPh, which  can only say that the consumer is  lucky, or it  can be 
defined as the economic analysis of the contingency  that can not be brought into the complete, 
informational and dynamic game model analysis of bivalent eco-products transaction. 
In the eco-products market, the buyers must reach the transaction decisions based on each other's 
strategies (depending on their own benefits and other strategies, etc.) and experience (such as the 
proportion between eco-products and non-eco-products), and use Bayes Law to make a judgment. 
In the bivalent model, if C is close to 0, that is, the sellers almost don’t need any cost to disguise the 
non-eco-products into the eco-products, which can not be discovered by buyers when the sellers often ask 
for high prices for the reason that low price is a absolute resort when compared with high prices. 
In the Analysis of entirely perfect dynamic game of bivalent ecological productions transaction, we 
can prove that when C>Ph, the game can achieve the ideal balance---the entirely successful and perfect 
Bayes Equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the price often fu lly reflects the quality of products, the seller of 
eco-products often charges high price, while the non-eco-products consciously charges low price, the 
consumers often would buy all of the eco-products. 
Based on the inverse push induction method, for the consumers who act as the buyers, if the sellers 
want to charge high price, the expected benefit of purchase from the consumers is P(e/h)*(V
Ph)+P(n/h)*(WPh)=VPh>0, where P(e/h) means the conditional probability of selling eco-products 
when the sellers charge high price, P(n/h) means the conditional probability of selling non-eco-products 
when the sellers charge high  price;  if the sellers charge low price, The expected benefit of purchase from 
the consumers is P(e/l)*(VPl)+P(n/l)*(WPl)=WPl>0, where P(e/l) means the conditional probability of 
selling eco-products when the sellers charge low price, P(n/l) means the conditional probability of selling 
non-eco-products when the sellers charge low price. In the above two  cases, the expected benefit of 
purchase are both 0 when consumers tend to buy eco-products. Therefore, the purchase of eco-products is 
an absolute resort when compared with non-eco-products. 
As the Enterprises who act as the sellers, they often charge high price when selling eco-products since 
Ph>Pl; on the contrary, it is more reasonable to ask fo r low price when Pl>0>Ph-C. Therefore, the strategy 
is really the only rational for the sequence. This time, the type of market is completely successful and 
belongs to the most efficient balance. The following combination and judgment are the only perfect 
Bayes Equilibrium (when C>Ph). 
a. The sellers charge high prices for selling eco-products and vice versa. 
b. The buyers buy all of the products the sellers sold. 
c. The judgments of the buyers are P(e/h)=1, P(e/h)=0, P(e/h)=0, P(n/l)=1. 
Among them, the four conditional probabilities  are serial when sellers want to sell eco-products with 
high prices, non-eco products with high prices, eco-products with low prices and non-eco products with 
low prices. 
The ideal market equilibrium mentioned above is not very common, in other cases when C changes, 
or other negative factors, it is likely there will be less market equilibrium, or even tot al failure of the 
market. 
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If C= 0, that is, g ives shoddy without disguised costs, only a fool would sell at low price. So the high 
price doesn’t completely  reflect the high quality eco-products. This time, if it meets the Pe*(VPh) 
+Pn*(WPh) <0 again (where, Pe is the probability of sellers selling eco-products, Pn is the probability of 
buyer's selling non-eco-products, that is, the expected benefit of buyers choosing purchase is less than 0 
and the only way they can do is to give up the products, thus the sellers can sell out any thing. In this case, 
the market will actually be the situation of complete paralysis, and finally the sellers will have all 
withdrawn from the market, which will cater to the so-called “lemons principle”---the non-ecological 
products drive the eco-products out of the market. 
2.2 Analysis conclusion of entirely imperfect dynamic game of bivalent ecological productions 
transaction 
In the model of bivalent eco-products transaction mentioned above, there are two key factors for the 
balance of ideal market. 
First, the disguised cost must be in demand and is often very high when the sellers who sell the non-
eco-products disguised them into eco-products. 
Second, the market share of non-eco-products is not large, consumers  will not be at  a g reat loss when 
they buy the non-econ-products by chance, and market  could also achieve some type of balanced success , 
for the reason that the consumers will not only be unworthy, but also actively participate in market 
transactions. 
What should be noted is that the second condition is closely related with the first . Because when the 
camouflage of non-eco-products is at lower cost (Strictly speaking, only at the time when the price of 
selling non-econ-products is not very large), sales of non-eco-products will get more profits than that of 
eco-products, thus encouraging more sellers to choose to produce and manage the non-eco-products 
business. What’s more, the market share of eco-products will be declined and the second condition will 
not be met. Therefore, the first condition, that is, the cost of d isguised eco-products when compared  with 
the size of price, is the most critical factors in the type of market. What’s more, the goal to improve the 
market equilibrium can be achieved by increasing the C or reducing the price of eco-products. 
3. Suggestions 
By establishing and analyzing the entirely imperfect dynamic gaming model of b ivalent ecological 
productions transaction, we can easily establish a scientific and high efficiency eco-economical 
mechanism from the aspects of government, enterprises, society, etc. 
3.1 The related departments of government can take punitive measures to correct and modify the market, 
then boost the C's standard and make the market in a balance development. 
The general cheating expenditures C, which refers to the total costs of cheating in the eco-productions 
market, includes the cleaning costs and fixing expenses before trading and the costs which the buyers 
realized and requested compensations. Therefore, the related departments of gov ernment can use 
punishments to correct and modify the market, then boosts the C's standard and makes the market in a 
balance development. 
3.2 The related departments of government should reinforce the authentications and supervisions of eco -
products' brand, and strengthen the standardization of authentications. 
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The brand in some degrees stands for the products' credit and qualification level, so many enterprises 
use the illegally brand to foo l the consumers. The ecological brand is a very important tactic for the 
consumers to specify the genuine one. The government's authentications and supervision is a necessarily 
guarantee for consumers and enterprises' legally rights, which  can significantly develop the information 
asymmetry situation between consumers and enterprises, then dismantle some illegally products and 
enterprises. Only by  strengthening the authentication standard and legislating some relative laws and 
regulations to the market, can we promise the eco-productions market in health. 
3.3 Enterprises can make "expensive commitments" 
For the enterprises with honest management and high quality eco-products, they should implement the 
measures of satisfaction assurance, such as return, replacement, guarantee and compensat ion, and 
increase the overall advocacy of its products, transportation and sale, etc. Through this action, they could 
improve the utility of consumption of eco-products, retain and expand the consumption of eco-products 
consumers. [8] After the enterprises, who produce and operate the eco-products, adopting these measures 
above, and if the enterprises, who produce and operate the non-eco-products take the same action, the 
costs of unique eco-products production technology, special transport and proprietary sales channels will 
also increase, thus the non-eco-products will be driven out from the market. The in itiative of the 
substance is to let sellers make assurances and commitments of their products quality, so that the sellers 
must pay off if something happened about the products. In the case that only when sellers make this “high 
commitment”, establish and follow the ecological and economic mechanis ms, did the sellers keep honest 
to purify the market environment, regulate he market behavior and have the rea l ecological economic. 
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